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MIAM! LAW QUARTERLY
injury arisen out of, or been due to the employment, recovery of a lump sum
payment might be warranted. The court in the instant case by refusing to
allow recovery in a lump sum payment where the injury arose out of the
employment refutes that possible distinction, and decides that the measure
of recovery should be the same whether or not the injury or illness results
from the employment.
In deciding the principal case the court was cognizant of the impossibility
of ascertaining the future expenses of the seaman; the indefiniteness of the
mortality table would make its use impracticable as a basis for a lump sum
award, and the sliding scale between injuries and illness, thus bringing about
lack of uniformity and difficulty of application. Giving the seaman a sum for
future medical treatment, where such treatment may be ascertained, has been
allowed by admiralty courts, 20 but a lump sum payment making the shipowner an insurer would be contrary to the spirit of the doctrine. The improvident nature of the seaman underlies the policy of the court in limiting
recovery to the amount that the sailor has paid out for medical aid. 2 1 If a lump
sum was allowed and the money was dissipated, the sailor would be left to
his own resources and would undoubtedly become a charge of the state, which
the doctrine, as formulated, sought to prevent.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-FAIR
TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY
Defendant, a communist, was convicted of contempt for wilful failure
to respond to a subpoena issued by the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. The trial court refused defendant's motion to exclude from jury
service those jurors who were employees of the Federal Government. Held,
on appeal, that denial of petitioner's motion to exclude all government employees from the jury panel did not deprive defendant of a fair trial by an
impartial jury. Dennis v. United States, 171 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert.
granted, 18 U.S.L. Week (U.S. July 5, 1949).
The Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution provides for the
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. At common law, Crown employees
were absolutely disqualified from serving as jurors in criminal cases; 2 but
Congress removed such disqualification regarding criminal trials in the District
20. Barnes v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 79 F. Supp. 699 (N-D. Cal. 1948);
United States v. Robinson, 170 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1948) (by implication).
21. See Hardin v. Gordin, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 6,047, at 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
1. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.

2. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1908)

(common-law grounds).

CASES NOTED
of Columbia.3 Thus, federal employment alone does not disqualify a juror
in a prosecution for larceny, 4 or a violation of the narcotics law.5
While government employees are not to be excluded from jury service
simply because they are government employees, 6 it does not necessarily follow
that they cannot be disqualified by a showing of bias. It cannot be doubted
that communistic sympathy renders the position of federal employees perilous.
Recent legislative and administrative acts have been designed primarily to
assure the unquestionable loyalty of all employees of the government, as for
instance, the Executive Order 7 which established a thorough investigative
review procedure with regard to the loyalty of all government employees.
Similarly, the House Committee on Un-American Activities 8 was created
expressly for the purpose of investigating any suspicion of subversive activities
or disloyalty to the government. These acts were undoubtedly designed primarily to protect government agencies from any infiltration of persons antagonistic to our form of government " and they have certainly created a fear in the
minds of government employees of being suspected of communistic sympathies.
In Eisler v. United States,'0 the defendant, a communist, sought to establish
the bias of certain jurors by showing that federal employees are anxiQus to
avoid sympathizing with communists since it would subject them to closer
scrutiny and endanger their personal security. Thus, it was argued, fruitlessly,
that jurQrs who are federal employees would tend to convict an admitted
communist rather than acquit him, to avoid suspicion of any such tendencies.
In the instant case, defendant openly admitted that he was affiliated with
the communist party in this country. Although he was not convicted for being
disloyal to our government, he was tried on other counts before jurors who
were federal employees. It is submitted that although employees of the government would not be endangered by a sympathetic verdict for the defendant in
a prosecution for larceny or a narcotics violation," and consequently, would
not tend to convict rather than acquit, it is not so where the defendant is a
3. 49 STAe. 682 (1935 amending D.C. CoDn 1929). Federal employees by statute
are not exempted, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1948), and in the District of Columbia are

qualified expressly, D.C. Cona § 11-1420 (1940).
4. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. (1939); cf. Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779
(10th Cir. 1942).
5. Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1947); Higgins. v. United States,
160 F.2d 222" (App. D.C. 1946); accord, United States v. Chapman, 158 F.2d 417
(10th Cir. 1946) ; Schackow v. Govt. of the Canal Zone, 108 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1939) ;
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. District of Columbia, 89 F.2d 502 (App. D.C.
1937).
6. Cases cited note 5 supra.
7. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947).
8. 60 STAT. 828 (1946).
U.S.

9. Friedman v. Schwellenback, 159 F.2d 22 (App. D.C. 1946), cert. denied, 330
838 (1947)
(federal employee dismissed, based on suspicion of subversive

activities).
10. United States v. Eisler, 75 F. Supp. 640 (D.C. 1948).
11. United States v. Wood, supra; Frazier v. United States, supra; Higgins v.
United States, supra.
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communist. It is obviously prudent for federal workers to convict an alleged
communist and imprudent to acquit him. One cannot disregard the conclusion
that trial by jurors whose personal security will either actually or apparently
be promoted by conviction and endangered by acquittal is not trial by an
2
impartial jury.'
It is therefore imperative that in selecting a jury which would consist of
federal employees in the District of Columbia, the courts be solicitous in
considering the nature and circumstances of the matters involved in the
prosecution. 3 In view of the above considerations, the court, itt the instant
case, would be justified in imputing bias to all federal workers who serve as
jurors in communist trials.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF
NEGROES FROM GRAND JURIES-SUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE FOR PRIMA FACIE CASE
The defendant, a Negro, was indicted for assault. Motion was made to
vacate the indictment on the ground that Negroes were systematically and
intentionally excluded from serving on the grand jury. Evidence was introduced showing that though there were qualified Negroes who had served on the
petit jury from whose members the grand jurors were chosen, no Negroes
had been called on the grand jury for ten years. Held, on appeal, the defendant
failed to present a prima facie case of systematic exclusion. People v. Dessaucre,
299 N.Y. 126, 85 N.E.2d 900; cert. denied, 69 Sup. Ct. 1510 (1949).
While a Negro has no right to racial representation on a grand jury in
proportion to the number of his race in the community,' nor even to be represented,2 the Constitution " guarantees a defendant that his race shall not lie
discriminated against by state officials in the selection of juries. Because of the
difficulty of showing intentional discrimination by direct proof of such misconduct by state officials, the Negro defendant has had to resort to other means
of proving systematic exclusion of his race from jury service.
InNeal v. Delaware 4 the Supreme Court determined that a prima facie
case of systematic exclusion was established by showing absence of Negroes
from jury panels for a long period of time, together with proof that there were
12. See United States v. Eisler, 75 F. Supp. 640 (D.C. 1948) (dissenting opinion).
13. See United States v. Wood, supra; Frazier v. United States, supra.
1. Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1908).
2. Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906).
3. U.S. CoNsr. AMEND. XIV § 1; 18 STAT. 336 (1875), 8 U.S.C. § 44 (1942) "No
citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be
disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States or of any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude ....
" (Emphasis added).
4. 103 U.S. 370 (1880).

